Processing Mode Causally Influences Emotional Reactivity - Distinct Effects of Abstract Versus Concrete Construal on Emotional Response

Is your best friend getting married? (Yes/No)

After participants worked through a short filler task, a computer-based recognition test was used to assess the interpretations that were made of these paragraphs. In an individually randomized order, participants read the identifying title of each test paragraph, followed by four versions of the final sentence, also in random order. Two of these sentences reflected plausible interpretations of the paragraph (“target” interpretations), one consistent with high-level construals (DR mode) and the other consistent with low-level construals (A-DR mode). Two of these sentences reflected implausible interpretations of the paragraph (“foil” interpretations), one consistent with DR mode and the other consistent with A-DR mode. For example, for the title and test paragraph presented above, the recognition sentences were:

1. Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of words (target, low-level construal, A-DR mode)
2. Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of disapproval (target, high-level construal, DR mode)
3. Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of aircraft (foil, low-level construal, A-DR mode)
4. Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of resentment (foil, high-level construal, DR mode)

Participants were told that none of the sentences were identical to those in the original paragraph, but that any number of them could be similar in meaning to the original paragraph. Participants were instructed to rate each sentence, independently of all others, for its similarity in meaning to the original sentence using a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (very different in meaning) to 4 (very similar in meaning).

Ten independent raters rated the plausible recognition targets (half of each mode, DR mode vs. A-DR mode, counterbalanced across raters) and 10 independent raters rated the implausible recognition foils (half of each mode, DR mode vs. A-DR mode, counterbalanced across raters), with the Likert scales used to rate the processing configuration of the training completions. We examined these ratings using a mixed-design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Sentence Target (target interpretation vs. foil interpretation) as the between-subjects factor, and Sentence Meaning (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the within-subjects factor. As intended, there were a number of significant main effects for Sentence Meaning¹. Relative to the recognition sentences designed to be consistent with A-DR mode, the recognition sentences designed to be consistent with DR mode were rated as significantly less sensory focused, F(1, 18) = 16.65, p < .001 (DR mode, M = 4.18, SD = 1.44; A-DR mode, M = 5.64, SD = 1.20), involving significantly more evaluation of meanings and implications, F(1, 18) = 15.43, p < .001 (DR mode, M = 6.34, SD = 0.98; A-DR mode, M = 5.02, SD = 1.23) and involving significantly more global, trait-level attributions, F(1, 18) = 5.93, p < .05 (DR mode, M = 4.49, SD = 1.23; A-DR mode, M = 3.68, SD = 1.59). Thus, the different recognition sentences do seem to index the intended processing configurations, with the DR-mode recognition sentences reflecting higher-level construals than the A-DR–mode recognition sentences.

Mood measure—positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)

The PANAS consists of two 10-item scales measuring positive affect (e.g., “interested,” “excited,” “proud”) and negative affect (e.g., “distressed,” “upset,” “scared”). In this experiment, each item is rated for the extent to which the participant feels that way right now on a 9-point scale from 1 (very slightly / not at all) to 9 (extremely). The PANAS has been found to be a reliable and valid measure of mood (Watson et al., 1988) and has been used extensively in experimental research.

Anagram stressor task—failure feedback

The failure-feedback task was a computerized version of the anagram-solution task used in Experiments 1 and 2 that included only the 15 solvable anagrams. The instructions informed participants that performance was related to intelligence and academic and career success and that they were expected to solve about 40–60% of the anagrams. During the task, each of the anagrams was presented for 20 s, after which participants were given 10 s to type in the solution. The computer then displayed “correct” or “incorrect” feedback, together with the correct solution and the proportion of anagrams solved so far. All participants solved fewer than 40% of the anagrams (M = 15.5%, SD = 11.1%, range = 0–33%).

Procedure

Each participant was seen individually. Participants were given the rationale that the researchers were examining the processes of imagination, visualization, and cognition. After giving written informed consent, participants completed the BDI, and then completed the first PANAS measure of mood, which was administered via computer (pretraining measure). Participants then worked through the training phase in their assigned experimental condition. After all the training descriptions had been completed, participants began the recognition descriptions. This was followed by a 2-min unrelated filler task, (a computerized version of the speed of comprehension test; Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992) in which participants made judgments as rapidly as possible as to whether sentences were true or false (e.g., “Admirals are people,” “Beef steaks are footwear”). After this, participants completed the recognition ratings, with instructions emphasizing the need to rate each sentence independently of the others. A further computer-based PANAS measure of mood (posttraining/prestress measure) was then completed. Participants then attempted the anagram task designed to induce the experience of failure, before rating their mood again via the computerized PANAS (poststress measure). The computer software E-Prime was used to administer the study materials and to collect participants' responses.

Results

The same sequence of analysis used in Experiments 1 and 2 was repeated in Experiment 3.

Testing the Induction of Different Processing Configurations—Recognition Ratings

We calculated a level-of-construal index consisting of the ratings for the high-level construal (DR mode) recognition statements minus the ratings for the low-level construal (A-DR mode) recognition statements, such that higher scores on the index indicate a greater endorsement of higher-level construals consistent with DR mode. If the manipulation was successful, participants trained in the DR mode would have higher scores on this level-of-construal index than participants trained in the A-DR mode.

A mixed-design ANOVA with Training Condition as the between-subjects factor (DR mode vs. A-DR mode), sentence target (plausible target interpretation vs. implausible foil interpretation) as the within-subject factor, and the level-of-construal index as the dependent variable revealed a large main effect of target, F(1, 38) = 31.78, p < .01, indicating higher level-of-construal index for implausible rather than plausible interpretations. Critically, as predicted, there was a significant main effect of condition, F (1, 38) = 8.11, p < .01, reflecting more endorsement of high-level construals in DR mode (M = 0.35, SD = 0.29) than in A-DR mode (M = 0.09, SD = 0.28). The interaction between target and condition was not significant, F (1, 38) = 1.63, ns. These results provide confirmation that the DR-mode condition was successful in inducing a mind-set more characteristic of depressive rumination than the A-DR–mode condition.

Testing Emotional Responses

Mood state during training phase

The scores obtained on the positive and negative affect scales in each training condition before and after the training phase and before and after the stress phase are presented in Table 3. A mixed-design 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) and Scale Type (positive affect vs. negative affect) as the repeated-measures factors, and score on each affect scale as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) = 61.46, p < .001, reflecting reductions in both positive and negative affect across the training phase in both conditions. There was also a significant main effect of scale type, F(1, 38) = 90.17, p < .001, reflecting lower scores on the negative-affect scale than on the positive-affect scale. Of particular importance, there was not a significant two-way interaction of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 1.90, p = .18, nor a significant three-way interaction of Condition × Time × Scale Type, F(1, 38) = 0.09, p = .77. These results indicate that there was no direct mood-induction effect of manipulating processing configuration and that both training conditions had equivalent direct mood-induction effects on positive and negative affect. No other significant effects were obtained from the ANOVA (all Fs < 1).

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations for Affect Scores by Condition and Time in Experiment 3

Emotional reactivity

A mixed-design 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) and Scale Type (positive affect vs. negative affect) as the repeated-measures factor, and scores on each affect scale as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of scale type, F(1, 38) = 33.54, p < .001, qualified by a significant interaction of Scale Type × Time, F(1, 38) = 41.43, p < .001. The main effect reflected elevated scores on the positive-affect scale compared to the negative-affect scale, while the interaction reflected an increase in negative affect from prestress to poststress but a decrease in positive affect from prestress to poststress, confirming the effectiveness of the anagram stressor as a mood induction. Of greater relevance to the hypothesis under test, these effects were subsumed within a significant higher-order Training Condition × Scale Type × Time interaction, F(1, 38) = 10.32, p < .005. The significance of this interaction means that the degree to which the anagram stress task increased negative affect and reduced positive affect was modified in different ways for participants in each training condition. Calculation of component effects demonstrated that this higher-order interaction was due to significant interactions of Condition × Time for each Scale Type, but acting in opposite directions. Thus, for the positive-affect scale, there was a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 8.34, p < .01, which reflected a significantly greater decrease in positive affect from prestress to poststress in the DR-mode condition, t(19) = 7.71, p < .001 (95% CI for decrease in positive affect, 8.23, 14.37), than in the A-DR–mode condition, t(19) = 2.03, p = .06 (95% CI, - 0.12, 8.32). In contrast, for the negative-affect scale, there was a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 5.91, p < .05, which reflected a significantly greater increase in negative affect from prestress to poststress in the DR-mode condition, t(19) = 3.89, p < .001 (95% CI for increase in negative affect, 5.35, 17.85), than in the A-DR–mode condition, t(19) = 2.48, p < .05 (95% CI, 0.55, 6.55). Figure 2 illustrates the simple interaction for negative affect. These results confirm that the training conditions had a differential influence on emotional reactivity to the subsequent anagram stressor task.

Figure 2

Effect of anagram stress task on negative affect after interpretive-bias training in Experiment 3

Discussion

The results of Experiment 3 further support the processing-mode theory. They replicate our previous findings that inducing A-DR mode reduced subsequent emotional reactivity relative to inducing DR mode. Further, this replication strengthens the previous findings because Experiment 3: (a) used a means of training processing mode that, although conceptually consistent with the previous manipulations, was more implicit; and (b) replicated the findings on the PANAS, a more detailed and well-validated measure of positive and negative affect. Moreover, the recognition sentences measure confirmed that the DR-mode training condition produced greater endorsements of sentences consistent with high-level construals than the A-DR–mode training condition, indicating that the manipulation of processing mode was successful.

General Discussion

In a series of three experiments, we have shown that when one is focused on emotional scenarios, compared to inducing a mind-set characteristic of that observed in depressive rumination, inducing a mind-set antithetical to that observed in depressive rumination reduces subsequent emotional reactivity. These findings are consistent with our principal hypothesis that processing mode modifies emotional response to a stressful event.

Across all three experiments, the pattern of results indicates that the two distinct training procedures were effective in manipulating the level of construal adopted by participants in the intended direction. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in the DR-mode condition produced more abstract and general solution descriptions, consistent with the processing configuration characteristic of depressive rumination, than participants in the A-DR–mode condition. Critically, this successful manipulation check was (a) on a non-self-report measure and (b) measured approximately 5 min after the end of the training phase, indicating that the training produced a shift in thinking that persisted for at least 5 min and was maintained despite the transfer of processing to a new task (problem solving). In Experiment 3, relative to the A-DR–mode condition, the DR-mode condition resulted in greater endorsement of recognition statements that disambiguated previously viewed negative scenarios in a way that was consistent with abstract, evaluative, and judgmental interpretations of the ambiguous scenarios. Again this effect was observed after a filler task, indicating that training produced a shift in processing that could persist for at least several minutes and transfer to another task.

Furthermore, these results clearly demonstrate that the different conditions had differential effects on emotional reactivity. In all three experiments, the manipulation of processing configuration had no direct mood-induction effect, with the training conditions not differing in their effects on mood ratings from pretraining to posttraining. Furthermore, immediately prior to the anagram stressor task, participants in the different training conditions reported equivalent levels of negative mood. Rather, the induction of the different processing configurations influenced emotional reactivity across the stress phase: Inducing higher-level construals resulted in a greater increase in negative mood (despondency in Experiments 1 and 2, increases in negative affect and reductions in positive affect in Experiment 3) in response to the subsequent anagram stress task than inducing lower-level construals.

We believe it unlikely that our findings could be the result of the DR-mode condition inducing participants to be more self-focused than the A-DR–mode condition, and thereby influencing emotional reactivity (Ingram, 1990). First, across all three studies, the emotional scenarios used were identical across the training conditions and each equally focused on self. Second, in both Experiments 1 and 2, we found that there was no difference between the training conditions in their effects on self-focus.

One might also argue that experimental demand may have contributed to the observed findings. Although some contribution of experimental demand can never be completely ruled out, we believe that it is unlikely that experimental demand was responsible for our results. First, none of our participants deduced that the training conditions were designed to influence their response to the anagram task, nor did they comment that the training scenarios were biased in any particular way. Second, as MacLeod et al. (2002) have argued, it seems implausible that experimental demand would lead to an effect of training only by influencing the emotional response to a subsequent stressor but not to a direct effect of training on mood. Third, whereas Experiments 1 and 2 had explicit training conditions, which potentially could have produced demand effects in participants, Experiment 3 had an implicit training procedure, with participants receiving no explicit instructions to alter their thinking about emotional events.

Importantly, the training procedure in Experiment 3 was designed to be methodologically different but conceptually equivalent in terms of inducing DR mode versus A-DR mode with respect to the training procedures in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, the fact that all three experiments replicate the same main findings despite these methodological differences reduces the likelihood that the observed effects are due to idiosyncrasies of experimental method or artifacts of each training procedure, and strengthens the argument that the observed findings are consistent with the proposed hypothesis. In all three studies, the DR-mode training conditions focused on inducing high-level construals such as abstract and general implications and meanings of events, evaluations, and judgments, which are characteristic of the phenomenology of depressive rumination, whereas the A-DR–mode condition induced low-level construals with a focus on the concrete, specific, sensory–perceptual details of how events happen, inconsistent with depressive rumination. Together these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that level of construal may be an important dimension distinguishing between processing modes that result in unconstructive depressive rumination versus more constructive forms of self-focus.

An unexpected finding was the observation that in Experiments 1 and 2, despondency increased from pretraining to posttraining, suggesting that the training acted as a negative mood induction, despite having equivalent numbers of positive and negative emotional scenarios. This effect was probably not due to an imbalance of emotional intensity across the scenarios because the positive scenarios and negative scenarios were matched for intensity of valence and vividness. This effect may simply be a consequence of boredom and fatigue after 30 training presentations. Alternatively, the negative scenarios may be more salient than the positive scenarios, producing an overall negative mood induction, because negative information has greater salience and dominance for subsequent responses than positive information (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Methodological differences between the experiments can explain why the training phase had a negative mood induction effect in Experiments 1 and 2 but not in Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, the interpretative-bias training paradigm is more implicit and covert, and, therefore, much less likely to induce negative mood than the more effortful and overt training paradigm in Experiments 1 and 2.

The observation that the training phase acted as a negative mood induction in Experiments 1 and 2 raises the question of why we did not observe a differential effect on despondency of the two training conditions during the training phase. After all, we hypothesized that relative to training participants into DR mode, training participants into A-DR mode would reduce emotional reactivity. Thus, if the training itself acted as a mild stressor, one might expect to see the training conditions produce differential emotional responses during training itself. However, two potential accounts might explain why this effect was not observed. First, the training phase may not have been a powerful-enough negative mood induction to produce the variations in emotional response necessary to detect the effects of training condition on emotional reactivity, unlike the more intense anagram stressor task. The anagram stressor task involves an unexpected, involuntary, and real emotional experience, whereas the training involves voluntary, deliberate, and imaginary emotional experience. The anagram stressor task is thus likely to induce a more intense negative emotion than the training phase. Further, positive and negative scenarios were deliberately balanced in the training phase to minimize any overall mood-induction effect. Consistent with this account, across Experiments 1 and 2, the anagram stressor task resulted in a mean increase in despondency three times greater than the mean increase in despondency during the training phase (see Tables 1 and 2). Second, it may have taken repeated practice on the training items to induce the desired processing mode. Thus, throughout much of the training phase, the intended processing mode may not have been fully developed and so could not operate effectively to influence emotional reactivity.

The current findings have a number of important theoretical implications. First, our findings provide strong support for the hypothesis that a mode of processing consistent with that observed in depressive rumination will result in greater emotional reactivity than a mode of processing inconsistent with that observed in depressive rumination. These findings indicate that differences in the adoption of these processing modes can causally influence emotional reactivity, at least within a nonclinical population. These findings are consistent with previous studies that found that a mode of processing characterized by a configuration of abstract, comparative, verbally based, evaluative, and “Why?”-type thinking produces detrimental consequences during focus on self, feelings, and problems, relative to a processing mode characterized by a configuration of concrete, process-focused, imagery-based, and experiential processing (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Treynor et al., 2003; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Taken together, these findings are consistent with the processing-mode theory, which proposes that the consequences of depressive rumination, in part, depend on the particular processing mode adopted during focus on self, problems, and feelings². Moreover, these findings suggest that processing mode may be an important element influencing the role of rumination in emotional reactivity.

Second, the absence of any differential mood-induction effect between the DR mode and A-DR mode across the training phase indicates that the abstract, evaluative processing mode consistent with the phenomenology of depressive rumination is not an inherently maladaptive form of thought. Previous studies have found that the maladaptive effects of depressive rumination only occur in dysphoric participants, such that it is the combination of ruminative processing with negative mood that seems to be maladaptive (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). In the current study we did not select dysphoric participants or induce negative mood prior to manipulating rumination, but rather exposed participants to a negative-mood-inducing event after inducing different processing configurations. Therefore, we examined the effect of a ruminative mind-set in the context of a negative mood during the stress phase of the study but not during the training phase of the study. Thus, our results are consistent with previous demonstrations that ruminative processing is only maladaptive in the context of dysphoric mood.

Third, Experiment 2 provided some tentative evidence that, relative to the no-training control condition, the A-DR mode has a protective effect against emotional reactivity, rather than that the DR mode exacerbates emotional reactivity. However, it is important to note that following failure, the default mode adopted in the no-training control seems to be similar to the DR mode. Thus, we do not know if the A-DR mode would have a beneficial effect when compared to a more neutral nonruminative control condition.

Fourth, the differential effects of the DR and A-DR modes on emotional reactivity are consistent with our level-of-construal hypothesis. As noted earlier, whereas low-level construals involve contextualized representations, high-level construals engender generalizations, such that it is hypothesized that in the context of a negative event, relative to low-level construals, higher-level construals are likely to produce negative overgeneralizations. Such overgeneralizations are implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression (Beck, 1976; Carver, 1998) and exacerbate emotional reactivity (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Within this account, the mechanism by which the A-DR mode would reduce emotional reactivity is by producing more concrete, specific mental representations that reduce negative overgeneralizations. Consistent with this hypothesis, inducing specific, concrete modes of thought results in less emotion to subsequent mood inductions, relative to inducing more general modes (Philippot et al., 2003, 2006; Raes et al., 2006). Similarly, these results have implications for cognitive models highlighting attributional style in vulnerability for depression, because higher-level construals are consistent with the global, stable attributions for negative events that are implicated in the onset of depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Alloy et al., 1999). Thus, level of construal during processing is a plausible candidate for a potential mediator of the differential effects of the DR mode versus other modes antithetical to depressive rumination. However, the current experiments were not designed to examine the role of this dimension (or any other dimension) as a mediator of the training effects. A design similar to that used by MacLeod et al. (2002, Study 2), in which the response to the stressor task is examined before and after the training phase is necessary in order to assess potential mediators of the effects of training on reactivity.

Finally, an unresolved question concerns whether there is a potential interaction between processing mode and the valence of the emotionally eliciting event, such that high-level construals exacerbate negative emotional responses to negative events but also exacerbate positive emotional responses to positive events (see Watkins, in press). Does DR-mode training specifically increase emotional reactivity to negative events, or does training into DR mode lead to people reading more general implications into any emotional event relative to A-DR–mode training, such that for a positive event, the DR-mode training condition would lead to a greater increase in positive mood? Currently, the evidence is mixed: Relative to inducing lower-level construals, inducing higher-level construals can increase the positive emotional response to positive events (e.g., compliments, Marigold, Holmes, & Ross, 2007) or positive mood inductions (Philippot et al., 2003, 2006), although thinking about positive events with lower-level construals has also been associated with increased positive affect compared to reappraisal (Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 2006).

The current studies were designed as a preliminary test of whether processing mode influences emotional reactivity, using an analogue of a negative event in a nonclinical sample. Despite a number of strengths including a robust experimental methodology and replication across three studies, there are several limitations. First, the failure induction was relatively mild. It is not known whether the present findings would generalize to more severe negative events. Second, our experimental sample was predominantly female, which may limit the extent to which we can generalize our findings to a male sample. Third, there is the question of whether the training conditions would have similar effects in clinical populations, such as people with major depression. All participants reported depressive symptoms well below clinical levels, limiting the extent we can generalize our findings to a more depressed sample. Because Moberly and Watkins (2006) found that similar training conditions influenced the relationship between trait rumination and emotional reactivity, and trait rumination is a known vulnerability factor for depression, we speculate that the effects of training observed here would extend to individuals with clinical depression such that training in A-DR mode would reduce emotional reactivity relative to training in DR mode. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, the A-DR–mode manipulation may be more potent for less-dysphoric populations, whereas the DR-mode manipulation may be more potent for more-dysphoric populations. A low-dysphoria sample, such as in the current studies, may find it to harder to engage in a manipulation training DR mode, whereas individuals more prone to depression may be more responsive to the DR-mode training. For these reasons, it is important that the generalizability of these findings to individuals with clinical depression is empirically tested.

A fourth limitation concerns the selection of the training material used. We assumed that training would have the greatest likelihood of influencing emotional reactivity if the training itself was focused on emotional scenarios that were relevant to the subsequent negative stressor. However, we also chose to use a balance of positive scenarios and negative scenarios in order to minimize any overall mood-induction effects of the training itself. One potential limitation of this design is that the use of positive training materials may reduce the ecological validity of the training task because naturally occurring depressive rumination is focused predominantly on negative events. Further, the inclusion of positive scenarios in the training materials may dilute the effects of the training on subsequent emotional reactivity, although this has the advantage of making the current studies a more conservative test of our hypothesis. One might argue that training would have stronger effects on emotional reactivity if the training items were exclusively negative scenarios and weaker effects if the training items were exclusively neutral or positive. Nonetheless, it remains an empirical question as to whether similar effects would be found if the training materials were exclusively negative, positive or neutral.

A fifth limitation concerns the possibility that the simple measure of self-focus may conflate distinct forms of self-focus. Recent theories emphasize a distinction between ruminative self-focus motivated by threat versus reflective self-focus motivated by curiosity (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). It may be that the distinct processing modes would have differential effects on these distinct forms of self-focus that the current experiments cannot determine.

In conclusion, we have demonstrated that it is possible to manipulate individuals' subsequent emotional reactivity by training them to adopt either a mind-set characteristic of the phenomenology of depressive rumination or a mind-set antithetical to that observed in depressive rumination. These findings suggest that it is not just cognitive biases toward or away from negative information that can cause variations in emotional reactivity, but also that the mode in which people process emotional information causally influences subsequent emotional reactivity.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a project grant to Dr. Ed Watkins from the Wellcome Trust, United Kingdom.

Footnotes

¹There were few other significant main effects or interactions: There were no interactions of Sentence Target by Sentence Meaning, all Fs < 1, and only one significant main effect of Sentence Target, F(1, 18) = 6.30, p < .05, with the evaluation of meanings and implications as the dependent variable, reflecting foils being rated as less focused on meanings and implications than targets.

²We note that our conceptualization of high-level versus low-level construals does parallel the subtypes of rumination (brooding, reflective pondering) reported by Treynor et al. (2003). First, the distinction between levels of construal reflects a theoretical model, whereas the distinction between brooding and reflective pondering is atheoretical and derived from a factor analysis. Second, both brooding and reflective pondering factors are multidimensional involving focus on self, focus on feelings, and self-judgment as well as abstract construals. Third, both brooding and reflective pondering have been associated with depressive symptoms.

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