Copyright © 2008 American Psychological Association. Mood Disorders Centre, School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom
Depressive rumination, defined as “behavior and thoughts that focus one's attention on one's depressive symptoms and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569) has been identified as a core process in the onset and maintenance of depression. Prospective longitudinal studies have found that self-reported depressive rumination predicts the likelihood, severity, and duration of syndromal depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).
One potential mechanism by which depressive rumination may contribute to the onset and maintenance of depression is via influencing emotional reactivity. Emotional reactivity is conceptualized as the change in the quality and intensity of affect in response to an emotionally evocative event, such as change in despondency following a failure (e.g., Rottenberg, Gross, Wilhelm, & Gotlib, 2001; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). Experimental studies have found that induction of depressive rumination intensifies dysphoric mood, increases negative thinking, and impairs problem solving relative to distraction in individuals already in a dysphoric mood, but has no differential effect in individuals who are not already dysphoric (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). These findings suggest that, when there is a negative emotional response to a stressful event, depressive rumination will further exacerbate negative affect and negative thinking, whereas when there is little or no negative emotional response, rumination will have no further impact. Thus, it is hypothesized that when confronted with a stressful event, depressive rumination will further exacerbate any negative emotional response produced by the stressor. Consistent with this, increased trait rumination is associated with increased emotional reactivity (Thomsen, Jørgensen, Mehlsen, & Zachariae, 2004).
Recent evidence has suggested that there are a number of distinct modes of rumination, each of which has distinct functional properties, some adaptive and others maladaptive, such that the consequences of rumination may, in part, be determined by the processing mode that is active during rumination (Watkins, 2008). Phenomenologically, depressive rumination is characterized by a multidimensional configuration of focus on self and symptoms, self-evaluation, repeated analysis of the causes, meanings, consequences, and implications of symptoms of depression, negative social comparisons, and “Why?” type questions (Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).
Moreover, this processing configuration is implicated in the detrimental effects of rumination. In studies of patients with major depression, Watkins and colleagues have compared two variants of the standard rumination manipulation. These constitute (a) an abstract, verbal–analytical, evaluative variant, consistent with the phenomenology of depressive rumination, in which participants are instructed to “think about the causes, meanings, and consequences” of their symptoms and feelings, and (b) a concrete, experiential variant, inconsistent with the phenomenology of depressive rumination, in which participants are instructed to “focus attention on the experience of” their symptoms and feelings. Compared to the abstract, evaluative variant, the concrete, experiential variant reduced overgeneral autobiographical memory recall (E. Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004), reduced negative global self-evaluations (Rimes & Watkins, 2005), and improved social problem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005), indicating that processing mode influences the consequences of rumination.
These results prompted the development of the processing-mode theory of rumination, which proposes that the negative cognitive and emotional consequences of rumination, including emotional reactivity, are, in part, determined by the processing configuration adopted during focus on self, feelings, and problems, with the mode consistent with depressive rumination having maladaptive consequences, and modes antithetical to this configuration having adaptive consequences (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Thus, the processing-mode theory hypothesizes that processing mode will influence variation in emotional reactivity. To test this prediction directly, it is necessary to manipulate the processing mode active during the stressful event experimentally, in order to assess consequent changes in emotional response. Inducing a processing mode consistent with the processing configuration found in depressive rumination (henceforth “depressive rumination mode” or “DR mode”) is relatively straightforward: There is general consensus that this mode is characterized by abstract, evaluative, and analytical processing. In order to induce a processing mode inconsistent with the processing configuration found in depressive rumination (henceforth “mode antithetical to depressive rumination” or “A-DR mode”), the manipulation needs to produce a mode of processing that is phenomenologically different from the processing configuration found in depressive rumination, and, in particular, differs on those dimensions that are the active elements influencing the consequences of ruminative self-focus.
One relevant dimension within the processing-mode theory is the relative degree of abstract construal versus low-level, concrete construal (Watkins, in press). Research on mental representation in the cognitive and social–cognitive literatures makes a distinction between higher- and lower-level construals (Trope, 1989; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). High-level construals are abstract, general, superordinate, and decontextualized mental representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of events and actions (e.g., inferences of global traits that are invariant across different situations, such as “laziness,” or representations of “why” an action is performed and of its ends and consequences). In contrast, low-level construals are more concrete mental representations that include subordinate, contextual, and incidental details of events and actions (e.g., inferences of situation-specific states, such as “tiredness,” or representations of the specific “how” details of an action and of the means to an end). Within this construal-level analysis, the processing configuration or “mind-set” characteristic of depressive rumination involves predominantly high-level construals about self and mood: Ruminative thinking is focused on meanings, consequences, implications, and “why” questions, and is characterized by reduced concreteness of thinking (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005, 2007). Furthermore, those experimental manipulations that demonstrate antithetical effects to depressive rumination, such as reducing overgeneral memory and improving problem solving, despite involving equivalent focus on self and feelings, are characterized by low-level construals, such as focus on direct, concrete experience and more specific, detailed representations of the self and of problems (Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Molds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).
Moreover, there are reasons to suppose that level of construal could directly account for variations in emotional reactivity. Whereas low-level construals involve contextualized representations, high-level construals engender generalizations. Thus, in the context of a negative event, relative to low-level construals, high-level construals are likely to produce negative overgeneralizations (e.g., “I am always making mistakes”), such that a single failure is generalized to a global sense of personal inadequacy (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Rimes & Watkins, 2005). Such generalization is known to increase risk for depression (Carver, 1998) and exacerbate emotional reactivity (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Moreover, voluntarily recalling an emotional event in specific detail produces less emotional response than recalling it at a more general level (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006; Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003), and practicing recalling specific autobiographical memories reduces the negative experience to a subsequent stressful task relative to prior practice at recalling general autobiographical memories (Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006). Thus, by influencing the extent of generalization, processing characterized by high-level construals is hypothesized to exacerbate emotional reactivity relative to processing characterized by low-level construals.
The processing-mode theory therefore predicts that adopting a processing mode characterized by high-level construals, consistent with depressive rumination (DR mode), will increase subsequent emotional reactivity, compared to adopting a processing mode characterized by low-level construals, inconsistent with depressive rumination (A-DR mode). In order to test this prediction, the current studies were designed to induce a mind-set either consistent with or inconsistent with the processing configuration found in depressive rumination (i.e., abstract, evaluative, analytical), rather than to induce a state directly analogous to depressive rumination itself. In this way, the studies only tested the role of one particular element of rumination — the processing mode adopted — in influencing emotional reactivity.
In a preliminary study using this approach, participants repeatedly focused on both positive and negative scenarios in either a low-level, concrete construal mode (“imagine the details of what is happening in each scenario”) or a high-level, abstract construal mode (“think about the causes, meanings, and implications of each situation”), before a failure experience (Moberly & Watkins, 2006). After the failure experience, higher levels of trait rumination were associated with lower levels of positive affect, but only for participants in the high-level, abstract construal condition and not for participants in the low-level, concrete construal condition. Thus, processing mode moderated the effect of trait rumination on emotional reactivity following a failure. However, this study was limited in only utilizing a student sample tested in a group practical class and in only using positive affect as the measure of mood. To confirm relevance to depression, replication of the finding is needed with a depression-related measure (e.g., despondency). Moreover, the processing-mode theory predicts that mode alone can causally influence emotional reactivity; therefore a direct demonstration of a main effect of processing mode on emotional reactivity, coupled with the findings of Moberly and Watkins (2006), would provide convergent evidence consistent with the processing-mode theory.
To that end, this article reports three experiments that investigate the hypothesis that processing mode can causally influence subsequent emotional reactivity. Experiment 1 examines whether an extensive training procedure delivered in an individual format produces a main effect of processing mode on subsequent emotional reactivity. Experiment 2 examines whether the effects of Experiment 1 can be replicated and adds a no-training control condition in order to explore whether the effect of manipulating processing mode on emotional reactivity is due to a maladaptive effect of DR mode or due to a beneficial effect of A-DR mode. Experiment 3 further tests the hypothesis that level of construal is an active element within the different processing modes, by utilizing a different methodology (implicit training of interpretative bias) that is nevertheless conceptually consistent with the induction of high-level versus low-level construals. In each experiment, participants worked through a set of emotional scenarios in a manner designed to train them to adopt either DR mode or A-DR mode. Following these training protocols, participants were exposed to an anagram stress failure manipulation designed to induce negative mood. Variations in emotional reactivity were revealed by variations in the degree to which the stress task altered self-reported mood (Wilson et al., 2006).
In summary, the aim of these studies was to test whether processing mode plays a causal role in influencing emotional reactivity and, more specifically, whether shifting processing away from a mind-set characteristic of depressive rumination reduces emotional reactivity. Across all three experiments, we hypothesized that those participants trained into A-DR mode should show attenuated emotional reactivity, relative to those participants trained into DR mode. We expected that training itself would not directly affect mood because the processing-mode theory predicts that the different modes change the way information is processed rather than the content and valence of what is processed. Furthermore, the training conditions matched positive and negative scenarios, so there should be no overall mood-induction effect or valence effect across the different training conditions. Moreover, previous studies have failed to find any direct mood-induction effect of manipulating processing mode (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Likewise, we expected that there would be no difference in the magnitude of self-focus induced across the training conditions as the training conditions were balanced for extent of self-reference.
Experiment 1
Method
Overview
This experiment consisted of a processing-mode induction training phase, followed by a failure stress phase. During the training phase, all participants read through 30 short descriptions of positive and negative situations while imagining each event happening to them. Each participant was allocated at random to instructions designed to induce either high-level construals consistent with depressive rumination or low-level construals inconsistent with depressive rumination, when processing each situation. After this training phase, participants attempted one item from a social problem-solving task, which was then rated as a manipulation check of the induction of the intended mode. Following this training phase, all participants then completed an anagram stressor task designed to induce the experience of failure and despondent mood.
Participants
Forty participants were recruited from a panel of community and student volunteers (age, M = 25.93, SD = 5.91; 10 male, 30 female; 25% students, 75% community volunteers). All participants were paid £10 ($20) on completion of the experiment. No participants met diagnostic criteria for current or past major depression on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV
(SCID; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1996) and all scored less than 12 on the Beck Depression Inventory–II (BDI) (M = 1.77, SD = 1.58; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The participants were randomly allocated to one of two training conditions designed to induce DR mode and A-DR mode, respectively. There were no differences between participants in the two conditions on any of the baseline measures (age, BDI, initial despondency), all Fs < 1. A chi-squared analysis revealed that there was no difference in allocation of gender across the conditions, p = .71.
Materials
Level-of-construal training conditions
Fifteen positive and 15 negative written scenarios, each approximately three sentences in length, were used as the training material for all participants. For example, one negative scenario read as follows:
You have an argument with your best friend. You have only had a few minor disagreements in the past, but this argument becomes heated and she tells you that she feels that she will never be able to trust you again. You are shocked and hurt.
For example, one positive scenario read as follows:
You go for a job interview. You are well prepared and able to answer the questions competently. The interview panel is friendly and encouraging, and you leave feeling very confident that you had performed well enough to secure the position.
All participants read through all 30 scenarios, with instructions to spend a minute concentrating on each event. The order of the written scenarios was randomized with the constraint that there were no more than three scenarios of the same valence presented consecutively. Both positive and negative scenarios were used for the training conditions to ensure the training conditions were not direct mood inductions. Rather, the training conditions were designed to ensure that the intended processing configuration was trained to both positive and negative scenarios.
To prepare the training materials, we generated 34 scenarios that reflected positive and negative events across a range of settings (social, interpersonal, academic, employment) relevant to our participant sample. Ten independent judges rated each scenario on 1–7 Likert scales for valence from 1 (extremely positive) to 4 (neutral) to 7 (extremely negative) and vividness from 1 (extremely vivid) to 7 (not at all vivid). We selected 15 positive and 15 negative scenarios that were matched for intensity of valence and vividness, and significantly different in terms of positive versus negative valence; positive items, M = 1.76, SD = 0.40; negative items, M = 6.03, SD = 0.49; t (9) = 22.00, p < .01.
In the DR-mode condition, participants were instructed as follows for each scenario: “I would like you to think about why it happened, and to analyze the causes, meanings, and implications of this event.” In the A-DR–mode condition, participants were instructed as follows for each scenario: “I would like you to focus on how it happened, and to imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a `movie' of how this event unfolded.” Thus, DR mode was characterized by high-level construals, whereas A-DR mode was designed to be antithetical to the ruminative configuration by focusing on low-level construals. Given that the training conditions were matched for degree of self-reference, we did not expect any difference in the magnitude of self-focus induced by the different training conditions.
Prior to the main training phase, all of the participants practiced adopting the assigned mode on the same (negative) practice scenario and described what they were thinking during the practice. Where necessary, further feedback and practice were given to ensure that participants understood the instructions and were adopting the appropriate mode before training started.
Anagram stress task—failure feedback
The failure-feedback task consisted of an anagram solution task, consisting of 15 hard-to-solve anagrams and 15 insoluble anagrams, each five letters long. Participants were given 3 min to unscramble as many anagrams as possible into real words. Before starting the task, participants were told that on average five to six anagrams are correctly solved in 3 min and that performance on this task is a consistent and reliable indicator of future academic and career success. Versions of this task have reliably been found to induce negative mood in previous studies (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). All participants were told how many anagrams they had solved correctly (on average, 1 out of 30) and that they had scored well below average.
Mood measure
To measure negative mood, we used a visual analogue scale on which participants rated level of despondency from 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely). This measure has been previously found to be a reliable and sensitive self-report measure of negative mood (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).
Self-focus measure
To assess self-focus, we used a visual analogue scale on which participants rated how much their thinking was focused on themselves on a 0–100 scale ranging from 0 (not at all self-focused) to 100 (totally self-focused).
BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996)
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report instrument developed to measure severity of depression in adults and adolescents (range = 0–63).
Manipulation check for level-of-construal processing configuration
To check whether training successfully induced the intended mode of processing, participants were given one interpersonal vignette (“A disagreement with your boss”) from the Means Ends Problem Solving Task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1972, 1975), and asked to generate the ideal strategy for overcoming the problem situation (Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992). A judge unaware of condition scored each participant's description of his or her problem solutions on the Stöber and Borkovec (2002) abstract–concrete scale. The descriptions are rated on a 1–5 Likert scale, on which 1 = abstract, 2 = somewhat abstract, 3 = neither–nor, 4 = somewhat concrete, 5 = concrete. Concrete thought is defined as “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, singular” and abstract thought as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated” (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002, p. 92). Thus, the abstract–concrete scale accurately captures the dimension of high-level versus low-level construals: More abstract ratings reflect general, superordinate, and decontextualized representations, which are more consistent with high-level construals than with low-level construals. There was good interrater reliability with an independent second judge who was also unaware of condition (agreement across all responses was r = .95, ? = .91).
Procedure
Each participant was seen individually. Participants were given the rationale that the researchers were examining the processes of imagination, visualization, and cognition. After giving written informed consent, participants completed the BDI and SCID, followed by the first self-report measures of despondency and self-focus (pretraining measures). Participants then worked through their assigned experimental training condition before repeating the self-report measures (posttraining measures). Participants then completed the MEPS problem vignette followed by further self-report measures (prestress measures). Participants then attempted the anagram stress task, before completing the self-report measures again (poststress measures). Finally, open-ended questions investigated what the participants thought the study was testing; no participants guessed that the training phase was designed to shift the response to the failure stress task.
Results
Following MacLeod et al. (2002) and Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, and Rutherford (2006), the analysis of the data is organized sequentially to address whether the training procedures were effective at inducing the intended processing modes, before addressing whether the training conditions influenced emotional reactivity. We need first to determine that the training procedures were effective at differentially inducing DR mode versus A-DR mode, before we can analyze the despondency ratings prestress and poststress to examine whether the manipulation of processing mode influenced the emotional response to the stressor. For this and all later experiments, an alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests and all analyses were two-tailed.
Testing the Induction of Different Processing Configurations
We used ratings of abstractness–concreteness for the descriptions of problem solutions that were written immediately posttraining to index the level of construal. A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with training condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-groups factor examined the independent ratings of the concreteness of the solution description to determine whether the training succeeded in differentially inducing processing modes that varied in level of construal. There was a significant main effect of condition on ratings of concreteness, F(1, 38) = 10.13, p < .005, reflecting that solution descriptions were rated as more abstract in the DR-mode condition (M = 2.85, SD = 0.59) than in the A-DR–mode condition (M = 3.45, SD = 0.60). This result suggests that DR-mode training induced a processing configuration characterized by higher-level construals than A-DR–mode training.
Self-focus
We examined the visual analogue ratings of self-focus to determine whether induction of self-focus varied between the training conditions using a mixed-design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-groups factor and Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the repeated-measures factor. Consistent with our prediction that the training conditions would not differ in the extent to which they induced self-focus, no significant main effects or interactions were obtained (all F s < 1.30).
Testing Emotional Responses
As noted by MacLeod et al. (2002), the training procedure itself could act as a direct mood induction. Therefore, we followed the two-step approach to analysis adopted by MacLeod et al. (2002) to assess the effects of training on emotional reactivity. First, we analyzed data from the despondency scales administered before and after the training task, to determine whether the training conditions induced differential levels of despondency. Then, we analyzed the data from the despondency ratings administered before and after the anagram stress task, to test the hypothesis that the training conditions would modify emotional reactivity. The despondency scores at each assessment point during the training phase and the stress phase are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Despondency during training phase
A mixed-design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the repeated-measures factor, and rating of despondency as the dependent variable, found a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) = 11.31, p < .005, reflecting an increase in despondency across the training phase for both conditions (see Table 1). Of particular importance, there was no main effect of Training Condition, nor a significant interaction of Training Condition × Time (F < 1 in both cases). Thus, it appears that the training procedures had no significant differential influence on despondency, suggesting that the manipulation of processing mode did not have a direct mood-induction effect.
Emotional reactivity
A mixed-design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) as the repeated-measures factor, and rating of despondency as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) = 14.86, p < .001, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 4.72, p < .05. This interaction reflected a significant increase in despondency from prestress to poststress in the DR-mode condition, t(19) = 3.70, p < .002 (95% CI, 9.33, 33.67), but a nonsignificant increase in despondency in the A-DR–mode condition, t(19) = 1.45, p = .16, (95% CI, -2.64, 14.64).
Discussion
These findings provide encouraging support for the hypothesis that processing mode may causally modify emotional reactivity: Inducing a processing mode involving high-level construals produced greater emotional response to a subsequent stressful event than inducing a processing configuration involving low-level construals. The training procedure appeared to be effective in manipulating processing configuration: Compared to the A-DR–mode condition, the DR-mode condition produced more abstract and general descriptions of problem solutions on the MEPS posttraining, consistent with inducing a mode characterized by high-level construals.
The results found for the despondency ratings across the training phase indicate that, as expected, the manipulation of processing mode did not influence mood: the two training conditions did not differ in their effects on despondency. Furthermore, the two training conditions did not differ in the extent to which they induced self-focus. These findings demonstrate that the manipulation of training condition had neither a direct mood-induction effect nor a direct effect on self-focus. Critically, the induction of the different processing configurations modified emotional reactivity: Inducing DR mode resulted in a greater increase in despondency in response to the subsequent anagram stress task than inducing A-DR mode. This finding extends the Moberly and Watkins (2006) results by demonstrating that more extensive training delivered in an individual format has a main effect on modifying emotional reactivity.
One issue unresolved in Experiment 1 is whether the differential effect observed between the two training conditions is due to the DR-mode condition actively increasing emotional reactivity, due to the A-DR–mode condition actively reducing emotional reactivity, or due to a combination of both these processes. In Experiment 1, there was no control condition where processing mode was not trained, which is necessary to distinguish between these possibilities. Therefore, to explore the active roles of the different modes, in Experiment 2, we introduced a no-training control condition. Failure and unexpected outcomes, such as those produced in the anagram stressor task, can temporarily increase the use of higher-level construals in the form of “why” questions that are concerned with attributing the cause of the outcome (Wicklund, 1986; Wong & Weiner, 1981). Therefore, we predicted that the anagram stressor test would spontaneously lead to higher-level construals for participants in the no-training control condition, and that the no-training control condition would increase emotional reactivity to a similar degree as the DR-mode condition and to a lesser degree than the A-DR–mode condition.
Experiment 2
The principal purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the central finding of Experiment 1. The same training procedure and anagram stress task were used in Experiment 2 as were used in Experiment 1, except that we added a no-training control condition.
Method
Overview
The same design and materials as for Experiment 1 were used, except that participants were randomly allocated to three conditions: DR-mode training, A-DR–mode training, and a no-training control.
Participants
Sixty-three naïve participants were recruited, using the same selection criteria as Experiment 1, from community volunteers and undergraduates, and assigned randomly to the DR-mode (n = 21), the A-DR–mode (n = 21), or the control no-training condition (n = 21; age, M = 23.21, SD = 9.14; 13 male, 49 female; BDI, M = 4.37, SD = 2.98). Participants were rewarded for taking part with either £10 ($20) or course credits. There were no differences between the three conditions on any of the baseline measures, all F s < 1.1, smallest p = .34. A chi-squared analysis revealed that there was no difference in the gender distribution across the conditions, p = .51.
Materials
Level-of-construal training conditions
Participants in the control nontraining condition worked through the same 30 scenarios as the other participants, and as in Experiment 1. They were instructed as follows: “I would now like you to spend a minute concentrating on this text. Specifically, I would like you to count the number of verbs that occur in the description of this event.” These instructions were chosen to ensure that participants read the text, without inducing either DR mode or A-DR mode.
Manipulation check for processing configuration
We repeated the use of the MEPS scenario with the rating of concreteness of solution description as a manipulation check for the processing configuration adopted posttraining. There was good interrater reliability with an independent second judge who was unaware of condition (agreement across all responses was r = .72, ? = .73).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. Open-ended questions investigated what the participants thought the study was testing; no participants guessed that the training phase was designed to shift the response to the failure task.
Results
The same sequence of analysis as used in Experiment 1 was repeated for Experiment 2.
Testing the Induction of Different Processing Configurations
Ratings of abstractness–concreteness
As predicted, an ANOVA with training condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training control) as the between-groups factor revealed a significant main effect of training condition on the rating of concreteness of solution descriptions, F(2, 60) = 4.64, p < .05. Post hoc Tukey's tests revealed that this main effect reflected the solution descriptions being rated as more concrete in the A-DR–mode condition (M = 3.43, SD = 0.81) than in the DR-mode condition (M = 2.90, SD = 0.44), p < .05 (95% CI, 0.10, 0.95), replicating Experiment 1. The no-training control condition (M = 3.05, SD = 0.38) did not significantly differ from the DR-mode condition, p = .70 (95% CI, -0.28, 0.57), whereas there was a trend for the A-DR–mode condition to be more concrete than the no-training control, p = .09 (95% CI, -0.81, 0.05).
Self-focus
A mixed-design 3 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training control) as the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the repeated-measures factor, and self-focus ratings as the dependent variable, revealed no significant main effects or interactions; all Fs < 1. These findings suggest that there was no difference in self-focus between the training conditions.
Testing Emotional Responses
Despondency during training phase
The scores obtained on the despondency scales in each training condition before and after the training phase and before and after the anagram stress task are presented in Table 2. A mixed-design 3 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training control) as the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the repeated-measures factor, and with rating of despondency as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 60) = 7.90, p < .01, reflecting an increase in despondency across the training phase for all three conditions. Of particular importance, there was not a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(2, 60) = 0.19, p = .83, suggesting that the manipulation of processing configuration did not have a direct mood-induction effect.
Table 2
Emotional reactivity
A mixed-design 3 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training control) as the between-groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) as the repeated-measures factor, and with rating of despondency as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 60) = 59.31, p < .001, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(2, 60) = 3.82, p < .05. This interaction reflected the absence of a significant main effect of Training Condition at the prestress assessment, F(2, 60) = 1.28, p = .29, but a significant main effect of Training Condition at the poststress assessment, F(2, 60) = 3.44 < .05. The nature of the interaction is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, although all three conditions displayed an increase in despondency in response to the stress task, relative to the DR-mode and no-training control conditions, the A-DR–mode condition attenuated the increase in despondency, extending the finding from Experiment 1. As predicted, the no-training control condition paralleled the effects of the DR-mode condition, with a very similar pattern of despondency change across the stress phase, albeit starting at a lower prestress level of despondency. Post hoc Tukey's tests showed that the increase in despondency from prestress to poststress was significantly greater in the DR-mode condition than in the A-DR–mode condition, p < .05 (95% CI, 1.34, 40.09), replicating Experiment 1. Moreover, as predicted, the increase in despondency from prestress to poststress did not differ between the DR-mode and no-training control conditions, p = .91 (95% CI, -16.14, 22.61). There was a trend for the increase in despondency from prestress to poststress to be greater in the no-training control condition than the A-DR–mode condition, p = .08 (95% CI, -1.90, 36.85).
Figure 1
Discussion
The principal aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the main finding of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was successful in this aim: The results of Experiment 2 confirm the ability of the training procedure to manipulate level of construal and modify emotional reactivity. Replicating Experiment 1, compared to the A-DR–mode condition, the DR-mode condition produced more abstract descriptions of problem solutions on the MEPS posttraining, indicating successful induction of the differential processing configurations. Furthermore, replicating Experiment 1, the manipulation of processing configuration had no direct mood-induction effect, with the three conditions not differing in their effects on despondency. Nonetheless, once again, inducing DR mode resulted in greater subsequent emotional reactivity than inducing A-DR mode.
The addition of the no-training control condition provided information about the default processing mode adopted by this sample of nonclinical participants, and about the relative contributions of the two training manipulations in modifying emotional reactivity. First, the no-training control condition did not significantly differ from the DR-mode condition on the posttraining rating of abstractness–concreteness of the problem description, and showed a trend to be more abstract than the A-DR–mode condition. This result suggests that the default response of the untrained participants prior to the anagram stressor is similar to that of participants in the DR-mode condition. This may be because nonclinical participants spontaneously adopt a higher-level construal style, consistent with extensive findings that individuals tend by default to use more abstract construals (Wegner & Vallacher, 1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986) and use a more global, abstract processing style in neutral and happy moods (Beukeboom & Semin, 2005; Bless et al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Alternatively, in this nonclinical sample, it may have been relatively easier to induce A-DR mode than to induce DR mode.
Second, the confidence intervals suggest that the effects of no-training control condition on emotional reactivity overlapped with the effects of the DR-mode condition but were distinct from the effects of the A-DR–mode condition, although there was not a significant (p < .05) difference between A-DR mode and no-training control. This pattern is broadly consistent with the prediction that participants in the no-training control condition would spontaneously adopt higher-level construals in response to the unexpected failure (Wong & Weiner, 1981), although this is a tentative interpretation that requires replication. Assuming that the response following the no-training control reflects the default response to failure, these results suggest that prior A-DR training reduces this default response to failure (i.e., abstract processing and elevated emotional reactivity), suggesting that training in A-DR mode has some active effect. Nonetheless, because the default mode adopted in the no-training control is similar to the DR mode, it is unclear whether the A-DR mode would have a beneficial effect when compared to a more neutral nonruminative control condition.
Experiments 1 and 2 both suggested that the manipulation of processing mode modifies emotional reactivity. Moreover, consistent with the hypothesis that level of construal is an important property discriminating between DR mode and A-DR mode, explicit instructions designed to produce low-level construals resulted in less emotional reactivity than explicit instructions designed to produce high-level construals. Experiment 3 further tested the level-of-construal hypothesis by manipulating processing mode via a different method that is nevertheless conceptually consistent with inducing high-level versus low-level construals. If a methodologically different training manipulation that is also conceptually consistent with shifting level of construal is able to replicate these effects on emotional reactivity, this provides further confirmation that level of construal may be a key active property within the different processing modes.
The manipulations in Experiments 1 and 2 involved explicit, voluntary, and transparent mental generation of the different processing configurations. Therefore, in Experiment 3 we adopted a more implicit training protocol in which participants were guided more covertly into the different modes to test whether we could conceptually replicate the finding that processing mode influences emotional reactivity. To do this, we adapted a computerized task used to induce interpretative bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000): Whereas the original task forced participants to make either a negative or a positive interpretation of otherwise ambiguous texts, our version forced participants to make interpretations of otherwise ambiguous texts that involved either high-level construals or low-level construals. In an unpublished pilot study using this paradigm with 40 participants, we found that the DR-mode and A-DR–mode conditions differentially influenced the ability to generate the reasons why a behavior was performed versus how it was performed (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Consistent with the intended processing configurations, the DR-mode condition significantly increased the number of “why's” generated but reduced the number of “how's” generated, relative to the A-DR–mode condition. Thus, these pilot data provide initial evidence that this interpretative-bias training paradigm can successfully induce high-level versus low-level construals.
A further aim of Experiment 3 was to examine whether our previous findings would generalize to a more inclusive sample and to a wider range of moods. To this end, we used a sample with relatively higher levels of depressive symptoms compared to the first two experiments. Moreover, instead of a single self-rating of despondency, we used the Positive and Negative Adjective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess mood. The inclusion of the PANAS allowed us to check that we could replicate our previous findings on a more elaborate and methodologically superior measure that encompassed more facets of positive and negative mood, including aspects of negative affect that are not necessarily related to depression (e.g., high arousal).
Experiment 3
Method
Overview
The training phase of this paradigm consisted of the following:
- Participants read 64 computer-presented short descriptions of social situations that remain ambiguous in overall meaning, until the final word, presented as a fragment to be completed, which resolved the overall meaning for each scenario;
- Across all the scenarios, each word fragment was chosen to lead the participant into making the required interpretation for the intended training condition;
- Following each scenario, participants answered a subsequent comprehension question designed to further reinforce the required interpretation.
Whereas Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) induced positive versus negative interpretations, we induced interpretations consistent with high-level construals (DR mode) or with low-level construals (A-DR mode). In other respects, we followed the methodology described by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000; see Experiment 1 for full details).
Participants
Forty naïve participants were recruited from a panel of undergraduate volunteers (age, M = 19.38, SD = 1.46; 12 male, 28 female). Participants were rewarded for taking part with either £6 ($12) or course credits. We included participants with minimal to moderate levels of depression symptoms (BDI-II score < 25; mean BDI score = 9.88, SD = 6.31). The participants were randomly allocated to two training conditions designed, respectively, to induce DR mode and A-DR mode. There were no differences between the two conditions on any of the baseline measures (BDI, age, initial positive affect, initial negative affect), all Fs < 1.16, smallest p = .28. The two training conditions were matched for gender (14 females and 6 males in each condition).
Materials
Interpretative-bias training conditions
The 64 training descriptions consisted of two or three sentences and remained ambiguous in terms of whether they suggested an interpretation consistent with DR mode or with A-DR until the final word fragment, which alone determined the processing configuration. Each fragment only allowed one completion, which was congruent with the required processing configuration. Of the descriptions, 32 were positive in valence and 32 were negative in valence, to ensure that the training phase was not intrinsically mood inducing. Across the descriptions, the DR-mode completions disambiguated the sentences so as to generate meanings for each description that were abstract, general, evaluative, judgmental, and conceptual. In contrast, the A-DR–mode completions disambiguated the sentences so as to generate meanings for each description that were concrete, specific, experiential, and sensory focused. For example, one negative description read as follows (with final words and condition in parentheses):
You are running a bath when you become distracted by a telephone call and forget to turn off the tap. The bath floods and the water begins to drip through the ceiling of the room below. Cleaning up the mess, you feel irritated because you are so w_t
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